Tuesday, July 1, 2008

What Is A Damper Control On A Tripod?

The latest events in Bakassi or crédilibité of Cameroon and his army in question

The abduction of our sub-prefect and officers of our army recently in Bakassi, just, once again, the problem, oh crucial, credibility, à la fois de notre pays, que de notre armée nationale, sur le plan sous-régional. Bien mieux, il vient mettre à nu les carences de notre gouvernance, c’est-à-dire du régime en place, et surtout, de sa diplomatie. Tout Camerounais patriote, ne peut que, légitimement, s’en offusquer profondément.

LES BANDITS ONT UNE NATIONALITE

Qui a opéré le rapt et l’assassinat de notre sous-préfet et de nos officiers à Bakassi ? La réponse du gouvernement est toute simple : « des bandits ». Traduction, des individus incontrôlables, qui n’agissent que par eux-mêmes. N’existe-t-il no bandits in Cameroon? Our government control there? It can be held accountable for their atrocities? Such is the reasoning behind the response made by the Chief of Defence Staff, in lieu of an official statement from our government. But, since the latter is no denying the opposite, this opinion is, ex officio, the government itself. He endorses it automatically.

The answer, unfortunately, can not be satisfactory, and is neither more nor less, as casual. "The bandits have kidnappés et tués, que voulez-vous que nous fassions ? », telle est sa traduction concrète. Elle ne peut, en aucune manière, nous satisfaire. Les bandits, quels qu’ils soient, sont dotés d’une nationalité. Dès lors que des voyous franchissent la frontière de leur pays et vont opérer de tels actes derrière celle-ci, qui plus est, en territoire ennemi, et s’évanouissent dans la nature, en fait, retournent dans leur pays d’origine, nous ne pouvons plus nous contenter de l’argument selon lequel, ce sont des individus que nul ne contrôle. Nous sommes obligés de nous en remettre à leur nationalité, c’est-à-dire à leur gouvernement. Imagine there be bandits Cameroon perpetrating murders across the same border in Bakassi, including assassinating the administrative authorities and officers of the Nigerian army, without the Nigerian government takes action? Impossible. And he would be right to be angry. But as regards our own, these murders were classified in the account, already heavily supplied, losses and profits in the neighborhood of Nigeria.

We can not allow that. Even better, we're asking ourselves a series of questions, 1 / - in whose interest Nigerian bandits would they come Cameroonian officials assassinated? 2 / - Bakassi is not the Niger Delta, these so-called bandits would they be spontaneous generation, since, firstly, we have never heard before, on the other hand, no to date, has claimed responsibility for the assassination, and finally, the bandits operating in the Niger Delta them operate abductions followed by political demands? 3 / - The Nigerian government, or else that of the Bakassi border state, does not he find some interest in conducting a guerrilla war in the Cameroonian administration that must be deployed on the ground? 4 / - assassination Cameroonian officials it is not the prelude to other repeater assassinations of officials in Cameroon Bakassi history of discouraging military officials and Cameroon to settle in these places? We see, we can not settle for theses bandits. This is, quite simply, to close the case. We say, no.

a series of blunders and low

In truth, the issue of Bakassi is the kind of bulky file que le gouvernement camerounais, depuis toujours, n’a aps su gérer. Tout a commencé par la guerre du Biafra à l’époque d’Ahmadou Ahidjo. Il n’était nullement dans l’intérêt du Cameroun de soutenir le gouvernement central, dirigé par Yakubu Gowon, ainsi que s’était attelé à le faire Ahmadou Ahidjo. Il était plutôt de l’intérêt du Cameroun de rester neutre dans ce conflit. La raison ? Une victoire du Biafra, dans la guerre de sécession, aurait été avantageuse pour nous, dès lors que nous nous serions retrouvés avec un Etat voisin moins puissant à nos frontières, à la place du matodonde actuel qu’est férédale Republic of Nigeria. But, Ahmadou Ahidjo acted advantage of tribalism as political realism. He has no special interest in Cameroon. He had, moreover, made his decision without consulting anyone. There had been no prior debate in the National Assembly. Everyone knows that dictators make decisions for themselves, otherwise they would not dictators. The Biafran war had the immediate source, the massacre of thousands of Biafra by the Hausa in northern Nigeria. In response, a year later, Odumegu Ojuku proclaimed the secession of the State of Biafra. Hence the war. How Cameroon was he concerned in the slaughter? Thanks in Cameroon, which had officially closed its land and maritime borders in Biafra, but in fact his second flight in army reinforcements to the central government, the Biafran secession ended in failure. This support of Cameroon to preserve the unity of Biafra, would have resulted in a profound gratitude on the part of Nigeria to our country. But, as has been the case? The Bakassi conflict is not he an eloquent illustration of the ingratitude of Nigeria? Ahmadou Ahidjo had acted out of feelings, Nigerians they make them to him today? The responsibility of Ahmadou Ahidjo is considerable in the quagmire that is Bakassi to date for Cameroon.

NO WAR NO PEACE TALKS REAL

After the departure of Ahmadou Ahidjo's regime has done little better renewal . During the first attack Nigerian Bakassi, at the very beginning of the crisis, Cameroonian soldiers on the front, waited in vain for the order to retaliate. Power, in Yaounde, s’est lancé dans les interminables réunions et atermoiements dont il a le secret, et les troupes nigérianes ont continué à avancer, inexorablement, puis à s’installer confortablement sur notre sol. Finalement, l’ordre de riposter n’est jamais venu de Yaoundé. Tout ce qui a été demandé à nos soldats, a été de contenir les troupes nigérianes, c’est-à-dire de tout entreprendre, uniquement, pour stopper leur progression, mais, pas de les déloger du sol camerounais. Or, nos soldats en avaient bel et bien les moyens. Puis, le gouvernement camerounais a choisi la voie de la diplomatie. Ce faisant, il a commis une erreur politique grave : la diplomatie, en cas de conflit, ne doit intervenir qu’après un cessez le feu consécutif à une rude bataille. Il aurait fallu livrer une guerre intense d’au moins un mois entier, contre le Nigeria, avant de passer à la phase diplomatique. Tous les stratèges du monde entier sont unanimes sur ce point. Pas de diplomatie, c’est-à-dire de pourparlers de paix, sans véritable guerre. En d’autres termes, le Cameroun a mis la charrue avant les bœufs.

Bien mieux, dans cette voie diplomatique, le Cameroun n’a pas su utiliser toutes les cartes qu’il détenait entre ses mains. Par exemple, le Cameroun n’est nullement parvenu à rallier à its cause, the CEMAC countries. One of them has even been recovered by Nigeria. This is Equatorial Guinea. Nigeria led him to file a complaint against us to weaken our position in front of him, putting aside all the good neighborly relations that had existed previously with Cameroon. In fact, Teodoro Obiang Nguema has acted in a statesman who therefore stands above all the interests of his country. Ahmadou Ahidjo that had failed to do in 1967 at the outbreak of the Biafran war.

The Cameroon had another card extrêmement précieuse, face au Nigeria. Il s’agit du désir de notre ennemi d’obtenir un siège permanent au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. Le Cameroun avait la possibilité de contre-attaquer sur le plan international, en menant une campagne basée sur le fait que, le Nigeria ne pouvait prétendre à une telle position politique sur le plan mondial, dès lors que son armée avait envahi le territoire d’un pays voisin, et y était installée. Il fallait qu’au préalable, Abuja opère un retrait de celle-ci, pour être en mesure de prétendre siéger dans cette haute instance de maintien de la paix, sur le plan mondial, qu’est le Conseil de Sécurité United Nations. But Cameroon has, simply, let slip through his fingers, this unexpected windfall.

THE CAMEROON never got angry at NIGERIA

Since the outbreak of this conflict of Bakassi, Cameroon has never showed his anger. He only shave from start to finish, walls, and nothing else. Since he has chosen diplomacy, and he had several options at his disposal. 1 / - It could break off diplomatic relations with Nigeria. He did not. Why? How do I know? The history provides no example of a country that has managed to maintain diplomatic relations with another occupying its territory. There is no example of this type throughout the history of international relations. 2 / - He might, at least, recall our ambassador in Lagos. Usually, when a country's troops crossing the border to another to settle on its territory, the first thing that happens, inevitably, is the recall of the ambassador of the country which was invaded , which is accredited with the invading country. Yaounde did not even do. What we feared? We were already at war. 3 / - Cameroon could have closed its border with Nigeria. We did not fact. 4 / - Cameroon could have requested the departure of all Nigerians residing on its soil. We did not do well. In short, we have not done anything that was likely to demonstrate our anger. In conducting the expulsion of all Nigerians based in Cameroon, more than 5 million people, that would put the government of Lagos in danger. This would have posed a real problem even internationally. 5 million expelled, it is not easy to manage. Naturally, Nigeria would have done the same, but how are we there? Are we reaching just 500,000 souls? Not at all. So what we feared?

In the military, we do not show our anger. Nigeria would have learned that Cameroon has already amassed more than 10,000 soldiers in Bakassi, it would have changed his opinion. But this too, we did not. Our attitude was to cajole, systematically, Nigeria, from beginning to end. In the end, he does not always cooperate.

POLICIES OF SYMBOLIC ACTS

From a purely political, not diplomatic, simply visit the head of state of Cameroon Bakassi had marked the spirits considerably, both in Nigeria and Cameroon. But nothing has been done in this direction since the conflict there. Once news of the abduction of Cameroonian officials, recently known, the Cameroonian head of state should, logically, to interrupt his holiday Switzerland, and reapply the next day in Cameroon, to go straightway to Bakassi. Nothing. He went quietly, his vacation and only returned to Cameroon for the CEMAC summit. Translation, " Bakassi to hell! . We saw George Bush in Iraq with his troops. We saw the American vice-president in Iraq, with American troops. We saw the defense minister of the United States in Iraq, with U.S. troops. We saw the American foreign minister in Iraq, with U.S. troops. When will the visit of Defence Minister of Cameroon in Bakassi? When will visit du ministre de l’administration territoriale à Bakassi ? Pourquoi tout ce monde ne s’y rend-t-il pas ?

TSAHAL FAIT PEUR

Israël est un tout petit pays, face à ses voisins arabes. Mais, nul ne peut se hasarder à le provoquer militairement. Tout le monde sait, d’avance, ce que cela va coûter. Tsaal, son armée, est redoutable. L’armée camerounaise, à ce jour, ne fait peur à personne. Bien mieux, elle fait même rire l’ensemble de nos voisins. A sa tête se troupe une bande de vieillards totalement gaga, plus hommes d’affaires que militaires. Et, tout autour de nous, tout le monde le sait. Le conflit de Bakassi s’est ainsi présenté comme une occasion inespérée de la faire respecter tout autour de nous. Mais, ordre lui a été donné de se contenter, simplement, de contenir les troupes nigérianes. Qui donc peut trembler devant elle ? Faut-il rappeler que c’est une armée qui n’est même pas parvenue à réussir un coup d’Etat ? Il se pose véritablement l’immense problème de sa crédibilité. Généraux gaga et corrompus, qui n’ont fait leurs preuves que contre leurs propres concitoyens à l’époque of scrub and dead cities, troops constantly in bars, getting drunk from morning to evening. The Cameroonian army burst out laughing everyone. That's too bad ...

0 comments:

Post a Comment